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Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities Regulation:
Comparative Analysis of the United States's Competitive
Regulatory Structure and the United Kingdom's
Single-Regulator Model
Joseph Silvia*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Does the form of regulatory institutions impact the efficiency and
effectiveness of the regulatory structure? While the current status of
the multi-level, multi-functional regulatory structure in the United
States has developed over many years, the recent adoption of a singleregulator structure by the United Kingdom offers us the opportunity
to test the impact of form on substance. To what extent does each
system efficiently and effectively monitor and enforce the regulations
of the financial markets?
This Article evaluates the current status of the multi-regulator
structure in the United States and the single-regulator structure of the
United Kingdom for a determinative assessment of to what extent one
system offers greater efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its
stated mission compared to the other system. Should the United
States consider a change in its current regulatory framework?
This analysis begins with a detailed account of U.S. regulation of
the financial markets and its participants, with a specific focus on the
securities markets. Part II of this analysis examines the U.S. regulatory scheme's origins, development, goals, and major issues. Part III
examines the United Kingdom's recently adopted single-regulator system and provides a thorough description of the system's basic structure, development, and major issues confronting the single-regulator
model. Part IV evaluates each model based on the following three
considerations: (1) safety and soundness in the markets through enforcement and prosecution; (2) costs and benefits derived from the
* Joseph Silvia wrote this piece in the fall of 2006 as part of his financial services law coursework and graduated from the Chicago-Kent College of Law in 2007 with a J.D. and LL.M. in
Financial Services Law. He is currently the Chief Policy Counsel with the Washington Legal
Foundation in Washington, DC. Mr. Silvia wishes to thank his entire family for their continued
love and support.
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regulatory structures; and (3) effectiveness and efficiency offered by
each system of regulation. Part V concludes.

II.

THE UNITED STATES'S REGULATORY SYSTEM

A.

Introduction

The United States is an interesting example of a single monetary
area and a common market combined with an extremely fragmented
supervisory landscape: a complex regulatory system based upon federal law (initially enacted by Congress in 1933 and 1934); state "blue
sky" laws; regulation by agencies with rule-making powers, such as the
Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), and self-regulation organizations ("SROs") with their own
rules.' Furthermore, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") in 1974 for the purpose of regulating the
2
commodity futures and options markets in the United States.
"[C]urrently, there are more than 10 federal, state and industry regulatory bodies in the U.S." 3 This makes regulation in the industry not
only complex but, in many cases, duplicative.
B.

Development of the Current Regulatory Structure

The great stock market crash in October of 1929 and the ensuing
depression the United States fell into severely damaged public confidence in the capital markets. 4 The political consensus at that time was
that public confidence needed to be restored in order for the economy
to recover and emerge from the Great Depression. 5 To this end, Congress held hearings to identify the problems and to engage in debate
7
about possible solutions. 6 The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act")
8
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") were the direct
result of these congressional hearings. Enactment of these landmark
pieces of legislation was designed to restore investor confidence in the
1. Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structurefor FinancialRegulation and Supervision in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 54 (2003).
2. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, About the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, http://www.cftc.gov/aboutthecftc/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
3. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From London,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18.
4. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe
do.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Investor's Advocate].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
8. Id. §§ 78a-78nn.
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capital markets by providing further structure and government oversight in view of the shortcomings and inadequacies of the state "blue
sky" laws. 9
Two simple notions delineate the purpose of the 1933 and 1934
Acts: (1) "[c]ompanies publicly offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public the truth about their businesses, the securities
they are selling, and the risks involved in investing[; and (2)] [p]eople
who sell and trade securities - brokers, dealers, and exchanges - must
treat investors fairly and honestly, putting investors' interests first."' 0
The 1934 Act established the SEC to enforce the new securities laws,
promote stability in the capital markets, and protect investors in those
markets." The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"), 12
which "regulates the organization of companies.., that engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading securities, and whose own
securities are offered to the investing public," together with the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act broadly establish basic principles and objectives
for oversight of the securities markets. 13 As capital markets evolve
technologically and offer new products, these three key pieces of legislation allow the SEC to engage in rulemaking to maintain fair and
orderly markets and to protect investors by altering regulations or cre14
ating new ones.
The laws and regulations governing the U.S. securities industry aim
at achieving one simple goal for investors: disclosure. 15 All investors,
whether large, institutional investors or small, individual investors,
should have free and open access to certain basic facts and information about prospective investments before the purchase of such investments, and so long as they hold them.' 6 The disclosures made by
publicly traded companies provide a "common pool of knowledge for
all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or
hold a particular security. Only through the steady flow of timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions.' 7 The effect of full and fair disclosure is more
9. Lastra, supra note 1, at 68 n.16.
10. Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
11. §§ 78a-78nn.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64.
Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transparent capital markets for investors, which is vital for capital for18
mation and success in the U.S. economy.
C.

Effectiveness in Regulating the Securities Industry

The SEC has supervisory authority over the key participants in the
securities industry. 19 These key participants include the securities exchanges, securities brokers, securities dealers, investment advisors,
and mutual funds. 20 A comprehensive securities law providing regulatory rules for both primary and secondary markets applicable to issuers, underwriters, brokers and investment advisers characterizes the
American regulatory environment. 21 Its complexity, multiplicity of
regulators, and demands for federalism within the Constitution further identify the American structure. 22 "Crucial to the SEC's effec'2 3
tiveness in each of these areas is its enforcement authority.
Enforcement action by the SEC and other regulators in the United
States is perhaps the most effective tool for defining the scope of regulation in the American capital markets. "[A]uthorities in the US...
have been very successful in prosecuting major corporate scandals
and, in so doing, recognising [sic] that those at the heart of those scandals are criminals and deserve to be brought to justice. ' ' 24 Enforce25
ment is the key method for regulation in the U.S. capital markets.
This is evidenced by the fact that over half of the roughly 3,100 SEC
26
employees are within the Enforcement division of the SEC.
While the banking industry in the United States is regulated primarily by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, with supervisory
authorities at the state level, the securities industry regulation is a
combination of federal law, self-regulation, and state law. 27 The SEC,
a federal agency, oversees the exchanges, and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") administers the federal system
18. Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Lastra, supra note 1, at 53.
23. Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
24. Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at Fordham Law
School, New York: The UK FSA: Nobody Does It Better? (Oct. 17, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uklpagesfLibrary/CommunicationSpeeches/2006/1017-mc.shtml)
[hereinafter Cole Speech].
25. Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
26. See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Home Page), http://www.sec.
gov/ (last visited March 2, 2008) [hereinafter SEC website].
27. Lastra, supra note 1, at 53.
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for the registration of new issues of securities. 28 The exchanges themselves are SROs with powers to promulgate rules for member firms
and listed companies. 29 Moreover:
The NASD... is a.. . [SRO] with powers - under the supervision

of the SEC - to promulgate rules governing voluntary membership
[of] broker-dealers in the over-the-counter [("OTC")] securities
markets, such as the NASDAQ ....

[T]he U.S. Congress intended

to strike a balance between the protection of the integrity of the
[securities] markets and the flexibility necessary to maintain an economically vigorous capital market. The structure was also intended
to balance the need for participation of the market professionals,
achieved through SRO self-regulation
and the need for an indepen30
dent watchdog, the SEC.

The American structure creates multiple levels of oversight and regulation, which may have been intended to balance interests and protection of investors, but, in some instances, can be economically
inefficient and wasteful. The economic waste involves multiple regulators initiating enforcement actions, thereby creating multiple layers of
liability to firms and personnel, resulting in redundant fines and sanctions from more than one supervisory authority.
In addition to the competition the SEC faces from the federal and
state courts, the SROs as lawmakers, the CFTC, the Department of
the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board also compete with the
SEC as financial regulators. 31 This competition can be good because it
creates debate regarding parameters of jurisdiction to regulate certain
securities products and the industry. Thus, the competition should ultimately result in the products and industry being regulated by those
who can most effectively and efficiently regulate each specific product
or industry. Competition among regulators has its roots in constitutional federalism and involves conflicting philosophies with considera32
ble overlap and inefficient duplication in the industry regulation.
However, the main principle in American regulation for investor pro33
tection has always been a matter of dual federal and state regulation.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUIrONs 753 (1999)).
31. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the
United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 495-96 (2003).

32. Id.
33. Id.
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D. Issues Facing the Future Development of the Securities Industry

Most current issues facing the American capital markets today are
those relating to New York's pre-eminence in the global financial services sector. 34 New York has been losing vital ground to markets in
London and Asia as the leader in global capital formation. 35 For example, in 2005, only one of the top twenty-four initial public offerings
("IPOs") was registered in the United States. Four of these top
twenty-four were registered in London, as that market had gained
ground in the global financial services sector. 36 The situation had gotten to a point where the City of New York actually hired a consulting
firm to issue a report to identify specific variables negatively impacting the United States, specifically New York's, financial services
sector.

37

Four factors have been identified as requiring close attention moving forward: (1) the globalization of capital markets; (2) overregulation of our capital markets; (3) frivolous litigation in the United
States; and (4) incompatible accounting standards across the globe. 38
Along with these factors, industry experts estimate that the gross financial regulatory costs to U.S. companies are fifteen times higher
39
than in the United Kingdom

Many issues the United States currently faces can be linked to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,40 which imposed strict guidelines for reporting, accounting, and liability in the securities markets. 41 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and combat corporate and accounting fraud; it also created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to oversee the activities of
the accounting profession. 42 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has placed considerable stress on industry participants due to its civil and criminal
liability potential, evidenced by the aftermath of scandals at Enron
and WorldCom. 43
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
of 15
41.
42.
43.

Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 3.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 3.
Investor's Advocate, supra note 4.
See Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 3.
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THE SINGLE-REGULATOR MODEL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

A.

Introduction

The United Kingdom's model for implementation of a single-regulator model was chosen for comparison over other European counties
with this model, such as Germany or the Nordic countries, because
London's capital markets' size and attraction in the world is more congruent with that of New York. The United Kingdom is also interesting
because its move to a single-regulator model was developed from a
merger of about ten regulators. 44 In addition, compared to other European models, the U.K. single-regulator system is more developed
and tested; it also offers considerable consideration in comparison to
the U.S. model.
The current regulatory regime of the United Kingdom was borne
out of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA). 4 5 A
single regulator, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), aims its
activity "at reaching a more efficient organization of supervisory activities, including a reduction in the costs of regulating itself."'46 The operationally independent FSA became fully operational on December
1, 2001 with the enactment of FSMA. 47 Within five short years that
the FSA has been at work, the "light touch" philosophy and approach
to regulation has helped London become the world's leading center
48
for mobile capital.
Legal scholars in the United Kingdom attribute the adoption of the
single-regulator approach in supervision of the capital markets to
three specific reasons:
(1) The existing system was failing to deliver the standards of investor protection and supervision that the industry and the public had
the right to expect; (2) [t]he two tier structure [of the U.K. regulatory system] under the Financial Services Act [of] 1986 was inefficient, confusing, and lacked accountability and a clear allocation of
responsibilities; and (3) [there was a] need for a regulatory structure
that would reflect the nature of the markets where the old distincfirms, and insurance companies had
tions between banks, securities
49
become increasingly blurred.
44. See generally Eilis Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the
Single FinancialRegulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003) (exploring the U.K.'s adoption of a single-regulator model).
45. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
46. Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia, Financial Market Regulation and Supervision:
How many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 463, 479 (2003).
47. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
48. Id.
49. Ferran, supra note 44, at 271.
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The Structure of the United Kingdom Single-Regulator Model

"[T]he Single Regulator Model acts as a 'three-peak' regulatory
model 'by objective,' in which the two objectives of microeconomic
stability - prudential supervision and investor protection - are assigned to a unique agency. '50 Macroeconomic stability is left to the
Central Bank.51 The FSA was given authority by the FSMA for a wide
range of rulemaking, investigatory, and enforcement powers, as well
as certain important responsibilities, including the ability to take action to prevent market abuse and to prosecute offenders for insider
52
dealing.
A key structural difference between the U.S. regulatory model and
the U.K. model is the U.K. model is not an enforcement-led regulator. 53 The FSA focuses front line efforts of regulation on supervision
and use of on-going relationships with authorized firms in the United
Kingdom. 54 Furthermore, the United Kingdom implements a riskbased approach, whereby regulation is designed to align the FSA's
finite resources with addressing the big risks that matter most. 55 This
essentially means the FSA accepts a "non-zero failure regime. ' 56 Accordingly, the FSA must, therefore, accept that some violations of securities law can and will go wrong when regulating the 30,000-plus
firms and 165,000-plus individuals under FSA supervision.5 7 The single-regulator model in the United Kingdom emphasizes listing requirements in the capital markets and the importance of self58
regulation by securities industry participants.
Four statutory objectives determine the umbrella under which the
FSA operates: (1) market confidence; (2) public awareness; (3) consumer protection; and (4) reduction of financial crime. 59 Use of these
basic principles encourages and fosters good business practice through
the financial services sector, as they recognize firms' duties to their
owners and their customers. The FSA believes "providing firms with
the flexibility to decide more often for themselves what business
50. Di Giorgio & Di Noia, supra note 46, at 485.
51. Id. at 481.

52. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
58. Jaime M. Jackson, Note, "Regulation S" and the TerritorialApproach to Securities Regulation: Are they Effective? A Study of United States Securities Regulation in light of British and
Chinese Securities Regulations, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 613, 615 (2003).
59. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
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processes and controls should operate so compliance with the [FSA]
principles is secured[ ] will better align good regulation with good business practice. ' 60 Furthermore, the FSA operates under the belief that
firms who commit to a set of outcome-based principles will be in the
best position to judge the detail of how best to deliver those outcomes
to the market. 6 1 This hands-off approach assumes "firms can best figure out how they deliver fair treatment to their customers in a way
which is aligned to their commercial objectives in terms of customer
service and retention." 62 This consideration accounts for the fact that
just 280 people, eight percent of the staff at the FSA, deal with en63
forcement actions.
C.

Effectiveness in Regulating the FinancialServices Industry

The FSA has a duty to have regard to the international competitiveness in the United Kingdom markets. 64 As such, the regulator is currently thought of in the international community as the "thought
leader," always seeking new approaches to better regulation. 65 This is
demonstrated by the FSA's deliberate regulatory shift to a more principles-based supervisory structure. 66 The FSA's decision to be a riskbased regulator is conscious and deliberate. Regular reviews of the
amount of risk the FSA is prepared to accept are conducted to focus
resources on those risks that the FSA considers to matter the most in
the current regulatory environment. 67 Three strategic priorities are
considered in regulation by the FSA: "[1] to promote efficient, orderly
and fair markets, both retail and wholesale; [2] to help retail consumers achieve a fair deal; and [3] to improve [the United Kingdom's]
'68
own business capability and effectiveness.
Unlike the approach sometimes adopted by regulators in the
United States, the FSA firmly believes regulators must be very wary
of overregulation and the damaging effects it can have on creativity,
innovation, and competition. 69 Recently, the Director of Enforcement
60. Vernon Everitt, Director of Retail Themes, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at CBI (West Midlands) Executive Lunch, Birmingham: The FSA's Regulatory Approach and Raising Financial
Capability through the Workplace (Sept. 14, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pagesfLibrary/Communication/Speeches2006/0914-.ve.shtml) [hereinafter Everitt Speech].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Everitt Speech, supra note 60.
69. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
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of the FSA indicated that "even where empirical analysis shows there
has been a market failure, [the FSA is] not always convinced that regulatory intervention is the most efficient and cost-effective form of
correction. '70 This contrasts the situation in the United States where
the SEC received almost 72,000 complaints and questions from investors in 2005.71 Rather than bring an enforcement action, or implementing any regulatory intervention, the Director of Enforcement at
the FSA further indicated market failures may also be addressed with
"competition policy or the FSA using its considerable influence with
market participants ...

to change firms' policies," without breaking
72

out the regulatory rulebook.
Focus within the FSA's regulatory function is on the outcome rather
than the prescription of detailed rules. 73 The hope is this will act as an
incentive for firms in the United Kingdom to focus on compliance in
return for a "regulatory dividend," that is, less regulatory intervention. 74 The philosophy is prevention is better than a cure in that it is
more desirable to implement "pro-active surveillance of likely 'hot
spots', [sic] up-to-date transaction analysis systems and industry coop75
eration to ensure a steady flow of information.'
Unlike the United States, the FSA does not actually have legislation
that separately codifies rules in a comprehensive securities act. 76 The
securities laws in the United Kingdom are dispersed among the other
laws, such as in corporation law and banking law. 77
The enforcement division of the FSA actually has no stand-alone
priorities separate from the rest of the organization. 78 Instead, the entire FSA is concentrated on two main priorities: (1) market abuse on
the wholesale side and (2) fair treatment of customers on the retail
side. 79 The FSA is able to prosecute insider dealing, market abuse,
and breaches of the "perimeter" (people conducting regulated activities without authorization) in criminal courts.80 The FSA may also
bring cases in the civil courts to freeze assets and to restrain unautho70. Id.
71. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 45 (2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf.
72. Cole Speech, supra note 24.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Jackson, supra note 58, at 631-32.
77. Id.
78. Cole Speech, supra note 24.

79. Id.
80. Id.

2008]

SECURITIES REGULATION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

257

rized behavior, among other things.8 1 Procedures for these actions allow the FSA to impose unlimited fines, alteration or withdrawal of a
person or firm's ability to conduct regulated activities, or even ban it
from the industry altogether.8 2 However, in 2005 to 2006, excluding
threshold conditions cases, thirty-seven percent of the matters investigated by the FSA concluded with no disciplinary action, and a further

nine percent of cases resulted in private warnings issued. 3 Prosecution of white-collar crimes in the United Kingdom, under the FSA's
supervision, has been sparse at best.
D. Issues for Considerationin the Single-Regulator Model
of the United Kingdom
Initial consideration must first be given to the obvious youth of the
regulatory structure in the United Kingdom. The FSA has had only a
short time to make its presence felt and the idea of what regulation
ought to be implemented on a massive scale. An end-to-end review of
the system in 2004 concentrated on improving efficiency and the enforcement process of the FSA.84 The concerns related to the fairness
of the process have led to a focus on how the FSA conducts investigations and how decisions are reached in enforcement cases. 85
Three challenges have been identified as what the FSA must consider moving forward. 86 The first is how should FSA oversight respond to increasingly international financial institutions? 87 This is an
issue for the regulatory community as a whole, but, because of the
international nature of London as a capital market center, it is of particular importance to the FSA. 88 The challenge is how to regulate the
international financial institutions "in a way which is not either at
best, burdensome[,] [] and at worse, contradictory. '89 Second, the
FSA must consider how to become more of a principles-based regula81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at Enforcement Law

Conference: Efficiency versus Fairness? (June 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pages/Library/Communications/Speeches/2006/0616-mc.shtml).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Callum McCarthy, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at The Smith Institute Breakfast
Seminar: The Future Regulation of Financial Services (June 21, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uklpages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0621-cm.shtml) [hereinafter McCarthy Speech].
87. Id.

88. ld.
89. Id.
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tor than it already is. 90 How can the FSA succeed in making use of the
principles, rather than rely on rules? 91 Decline in the number of rules,
combined with the increased use of principles, leads to an issue of
adequate prediction under the principles the regulated enjoy with precise rules. 92 Finally, how will the FSA retain its focus as the single
financial services regulator in the United Kingdom? 93 This includes
"both external understanding of what [the FSA does and does not] do,
and why; and the internal managerial concentration on a limited num' 94
ber of objectives.
"[T]he presence of a sole regulator might foment and accelerate
collusive relations between the regulator and the regulated," resulting
in "regulatory capture" for the FSA. 95 Furthermore, this model is affected by possible incompatibility among different supervisory objectives, and may also lead to problems of self-contradiction if authority
leads to conflicting supervisory objectives. 96 A single-regulator model
"strongly depends on its internal organization: if the numerous areas
of competence and specialization are not well-structured and coordi' 97
nated, the decision-making process risks slowing down."

IV.

THE BETTER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:

A
A.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Three Considerationsin an Effective Analysis

Comparison of the two approaches to securities regulation must involve an analysis of the three main components of regulation for the
capital markets. First, due consideration must be given to one of the
most effective means of deterrence in the securities industry, that of
prosecution for violations of the rules and regulations imposed by the
supervisory authorities. Second, a simple analysis of the costs associated with each system as well as the benefits borne from those costs
must be performed. Finally, we will assess the overall effectiveness
and efficiency of each system in relation to each other to correctly
determine whether it would be reasonable and prudent for the United
States to consider restructuring its regulation system to more closely
resemble that of the United Kingdom.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
McCarthy Speech, supra note 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Di Giorgio & Di Noia, supra note 46, at 480.
Id.
Id. at 479.
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Safe and Sound Practice in the Markets:
Prosecution of Violations

Among several criticisms of the United Kingdom's "light touch" approach to regulation, three stand out: [1] there is a "conspicuous absence of criminal prosecution of securities law violations in the UK[;]
...[2]

the FSA's resources are widely stretched across its huge juris-

diction[; and [3] the FSA's] strategic approach to enforcement sends
out selective messages to the markets and allows some illicit activity to
go unpunished." 98 Proponents of the U.S. regulatory structure indicate, quite correctly, that the regulators, the investors, and even the
regulated firms derive great benefit in the safety and security offered
by detailed rules that define the scope of their legal exposure. 99 However, dissenters point out that even this authoritative and enforceable
rule-based standard will not fully prevent dishonest practice. 100 The
natural and correct response to this is there is simply no conceivable
manner in which all illicit activity can be prevented. This basic premise

does not change in any regulatory structure.
Most adverse to the current U.S. regulatory scheme is the principlebased approach of the FSA. The enforcement team at the FSA pales
in comparison to that of the SEC in terms of the percentage of staff
assigned to enforcement responsibilities; the FSA devotes just eight
percent of the staff to enforcement, while the SEC devotes over half
the staff to the enforcement division. 10 1 This stark contrast exemplifies
the inherent cultural differences between the mindset of the United
States's and United Kingdom's regulatory authorities.
Appetite for prosecution in the United States has created a reputation for the United States, good or bad, based on the knowledge that
all those who engage in an alternative or borderline activity will minimally be a subject of investigation by the SEC, CFTC, or the Department of Justice in cases where criminal prosecution is warranted, not
forgetting the SROs and State securities regulators. For example, the
total value of securities class-action lawsuits in the United States has
skyrocketed from just 150 million dollars in 1997 to 9.6 billion dollars
in 2005.102
On the other side of the pond, the FSA has accepted the knowledge
that some illegal activity may go unpunished, but focus will be placed
98. Cole Speech, supra note 24.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Compare Cole Speech, supra note 24, with SEC website, supra note 26.
102. Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 3.
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on higher-risk issues in the market. 10 3 The current criminal caseload
for the FSA and its Securities Fraud Office is comprised of approximately ten cases for trial per year, but essentially more is at stake
because the practice of plea bargaining and giving "state's evidence"
is not currently allowed in the United Kingdom, unlike in the United
States. 1°4 However, the FSA has indicated an acceptance that there
are some instances that call for criminal prosecution and, furthermore,
acknowledges an increased load of cases in the future to solidify the
05
gains London has made on the world stage.
C. Associated Costs and the Realized Benefits
A choice between a specified, single-regulator model, and a multiregulator model necessarily hinges on practical considerations of the
costs and benefits to the regulators, firms, and market participants.
Possible overregulation costs the firms more in compliance, not only
in monetary terms, but, in the United States, there "appears to be a
worrisome trend of corporate leaders focusing inordinate time on
compliance minutiae rather than innovative strategies for growth";
these leaders are fearful of penalties assessed on the firm, but, more
importantly, they are fearful of personal financial penalties from overzealous regulators. 10 6 U.S. regulators consistently compete to be the
"toughest cop on the street," while the U.K. system focuses on collab07
oration and solutions to problems.
Although deregulation, or simply less regulation, may help some
countries gain short term benefits from an influx of business to the
markets, the long-term prospects are less beneficial, as they indicate
injury to the stability and reliability of the global marketplace. 10 8 A
few recent examples identified by industry experts may shed light on
the positives of deregulation for the U.S. market.
Recent U.S. financial history provides two specific examples which
serve to show the weakness of a multi-level, multifunctional regulatory system. Continental Illinois was one of the top ten banks in this
country entering the 1980s expansion. With the slowdown in the Midwest economy during the rust belt era, Continental attempted to grow
by attracting wholesale deposits (hot money) nationally, in part, because the state of Illinois did not allow banks to branch outside their
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home county in search of retail deposits. 10 9 When it became known
that Continental was having some difficulties due to energy lending,
these hot money deposits left the bank quickly and Continental was
quickly in a liquidity squeeze. Had there been a single national bank
regulation with respect to branching, then Continental might have
been able to draw deposits from a wider retail base and would have
likely avoided a crisis. Eventually, Continental was absorbed into
Bank of America." 0
On the multi-functional front, the experience of the 1990-1991 experience is useful. At that time, several regulators became concerned
about the viability of high yield bonds. Acting on their own, thrift and
bank regulators requested that financial institutions liquidate their
holdings of high yield bonds and/or limit lending in such deals."' If
there were a single, national regulator, then it might have been more
likely that a national regulator would have avoided the multiple demands for liquidation of high yield bonds, the subsequent shortage of
market liquidity, the closure of some thrifts, and the amplification of
11 2
economic recession during the 1990-1991 period.
Advocates of the U.K. model advance the proposition that overregulation is too costly, inefficient, and leads to inevitable exploitation
and abuses along regulatory seams." 3 Furthermore, "the costs of supervision charged to those regulated and/or to taxpayers decrease,
and there is less room for 'regulatory arbitrage."' 4 "Industry experts
estimate that the gross financial regulatory costs to U.S. companies
are 15 times higher than in Britain." 115 Firms in the United Kingdom
benefit greatly from a principles-based approach because it enables
them to decide, within reasonability, the most prudent course for the
firm and the investors. U.S. firms look at desired courses of business
only to find hurdles placed one after another to ensure compliance
with all specific rules and regulations. Here, increased cost comes with
the benefit of increased certainty, but, in the United Kingdom, the
benefit comes with an almost hurdle-free path.
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The FSA indicates:
[Flour pillars essential to delivering a more effective and efficient
retail market: [1] Capable and confident consumers; [2] clear, simple and understandable information available for, and used by, consumers from the industry and the FSA; [3] soundly managed and
well capitalized firms who treat their customers fairly and; [4] proportionate, risk-based regulation founded on key principles, including a reliance
on the senior management of firms to discharge their
116
obligations.

The SEC conducts itself according to the mission of protecting investors, maintaining a fair, orderly and efficient market, and facilitating capital formation. 117 The goals of each system are congruent, but
the efficiency and effectiveness of each is not. Scholars advocating the
regulatory system of the United States point to the competitive nature
of regulation in the United States as providing the optimal level of
regulatory intrusion upon private business interests. 118 Advocates of
the U.S. competitive model further "contend that competing regulatory bodies will not only govern less, but also more efficiently."1 19
However, the FSA's "light touch" approach, including a governing
emphasis on the principles, has been highly effective.1 20 Backed by
bold and strategic enforcement action, this approach has been effective in creating a more collaborative, solutions-oriented regulatory
system attracting more business to London's capital markets.' 2 ' For
example, by the end of September 2005, "companies had raised more
capital on the main market of the London Stock Exchange (the LSE)
($26.7 bn) than the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ combined ($26.4 bn) - [these figures do] not include the $6.7 bn
raised on the LSE's Alternative Investment Market.' 2 2 Moreover,
the LSE had attracted fifty-nine international IPO deals in the first
three quarters of 2005, worth $15.9 billion, whereas the NYSE and
123
NASDAQ together had only attracted 17 deals worth $5.9 billion.
Additionally, "there is a regulatory dividend that London enjoys
under the auspices of the Financial Services Authority," which has
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"bolstered London's status to establish itself as the world's leading
centre for mobile capital."'1 24 Much of the advantage the U.K. system
enjoys stems from the economies of scale associated with the FSA's
regulatory structure. These economies of scale produce fixed costs, logistical expenses, administrative personnel costs, and executive management compensation costs which are all considerably reduced in the
U.K. universal regulator approach. 125 There is also one single-regula126
tor accountable to the legislative body.
V.

CONCLUSION

While this begins discussion on the economic efficiencies each regulatory system has to offer, there is much more research and observation necessary in future years before any determinative assessment
can be made about which system is "better." Both the United Kingdom's and the United States's supervisory authorities maintain similar
goals and missions, but implement very different initiatives to achieve
these goals. The U.S. system offers competition among regulators, but
engages in far greater enforcement. The United Kingdom regulates
primarily through principles, with a last resort of bringing enforcement actions, but there may be less certainty in these principles than
can be achieved with detailed rules.
Furthermore, effectiveness in each system must be observed in
greater detail in the future before alteration to the U.S. system is
made. However, "the creation of such a monopoly supervisory authority is extremely unlikely and, according to Greenspan, 'highly undesirable on both political and economic grounds."1 27 Fundamental legal
change and a fundamental change in the public mindset of the U.S.
securities industry would be necessary to accomplish a change to a
single-regulator model, and, right now, this seems to be unnecessary
and unacceptable to current regulators in the United States. As both
regulatory systems continue to achieve their missions, a drastic shift in
the U.S. system to look more like the United Kingdom's does not offer enough advantages at this point. Slowly implemented, small steps
of deregulation may be the best way to move towards the principles
and ideas inherent in a universal regulatory system, but, for now, the
competitive nature of the U.S. regulatory structure is here to stay.
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